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The management performance of a bank is highly affected by bad debt the bank has written off related to loan 
receivables. When this happens, discretionary action regarding the setting of the allowance for loan losses is 
enabled, through which the big bath phenomenon often occurs. The present study investigates this big bath 
phenomenon. In particular, it attempts to determine whether it occurs when the allowance for loan losses is set 
during a specific period of time – namely the period in which large shareholders change and the new shareholder 
brings a capital influx. An examination was carried out through a case analysis for a savings bank. Z Savings Bank 
was selected, and for comparison and analysis, similar savings banks were studied. From 2002 to 2014, large 
shareholders at Z Savings Bank changed four times. The analysis revealed that when individual-to-individual 
shareholder changes took place, the big bath phenomenon did not occur. However, in two cases, one in 2011 and 
the other in 2014, individual-to-company shareholder changes took place. In these two cases, management 
performance showed high variations, and it was confirmed that the typical big bath phenomenon occurred. 
According to the analysis, this was due to an environmental factor that caused distressed debts to be reflected at 
their maximum value. This was done via an inspection process that was triggered when the capital held by the large 
companies – both Korean and foreign – was brought in. Specifically, the bad debt being written off and the 
allowances for loan losses were intentionally exposed in the accounting in order to provide transparency when the 
shareholder changes took place. This phenomenon occurred because the Financial Supervisory Commission 
reinforced the obligatory allowance-setting rate to ensure the soundness of assets. 
 





n earnings management, a CEO typically aims to maximize management performance to garner trust 
from a number of key persons. This improves his/her chances of reappointment. Alternatively, when 
management performance is aggravated, the CEO maximizes the repayment for the distressed debt and 
the loan receivables to reduce the overall financial performance (Yoon and Moon, 2005; Lee and Cheon, 1999). In 
addition, when a management power holder wants to take over a company, he/she lowers the remaining value in 
order to lower the negotiated take-over price (DeAngelo, 1986). A big bath is an accounting technique that reflects 
the troubled assets in an accounting year to disclose the potential poor economic status or profit size as it is. Its 
effect is that whereas the current profits (losses) are highly reduced (overly reported), future profits (losses) increase 
(decrease) (Lee et al., 2009). When the CEO changes, the bad debt is increased centering around the accounting 
process for doubtful accounts written off to reduce the operating income, ordinary income, and net income. On the 
other hand, the bad debt is reduced during the accounting period after the CEO changes to ultimately expand the 
management performance (Kim et al., 2012).  
  
I 
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The big bath phenomenon described above occurs occasionally in the financial sector and in non-monetary 
institutions. When large shareholders change, a similar phenomenon appears. Essentially, a company whose 
shareholder portion increases attempts to decrease the reported profit in the year before the share increase, and a 
company whose shareholder portion decreases attempts to expand the reported profits in the accounting period 
before the share decrease. (Yi and Park, 2006). In addition, as the shares owned by foreign large shareholders 
increase, the earnings management of the company is affected. Thus, it has been found that earnings management 
tendencies have a significant relationship with the share rates of large shareholders and the share rates of foreign 
shareholders (Park, 2003).  
 
This study attempts to verify whether the same phenomenon is shown in a non-monetary institution after the change 
of a large shareholder. Accordingly, it looks at how the big bath phenomenon appears in a savings bank, which is a 
non-monetary institution. It investigates the correlation between the big bath phenomenon and a large shareholder 
change, or between the big bath phenomenon and the variation in large shareholder share rates, and between the big 
bath phenomenon and the variation in foreign shareholder share rates. Generally, the management performance of a 
banking business is highly affected by the amount of bad debt it has written off related to loan receivables. With 
respect to the bad debt expenses that occupy a significant portion of operating expenses, it is possible that the bank 
has a certain amount of autonomy to take voluntary action (Kim et al., 2012). Thus, this study investigates the big 
bath phenomenon according to large shareholder changes in a foreign savings bank, focusing on loan loss 
allowances. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related literature, Chapter 3 
describes big bath-related cases for Z Savings Bank, and Chapter 4 discusses the results and suggestive points based 
on the case analysis.  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Large Shareholders and Earnings Management 
 
Company shareholder changes can be categorized as follows: from individual to individual, from individual to 
Korean domestic corporate body, or from individual to foreign corporate body. When a company experiences an 
increase in the shares of large shareholders, the reported profits in the year before the share increase are reduced 
(Lee and Park, 2006). This affects the level of earnings management of the company. When the share rate of large 
shareholders or foreign shareholders expand, companies manage their earnings in the direction that raises earnings 
(Park et al., 2009). A big bath occurs when the amount of earnings in excess of the general earnings management is 
intentionally lowered. This causes the net income to be highly reduced or the net loss to be overly reported. Thus, 
for companies, earnings management types can be classified into deficit avoidance companies and big bath 
companies (Kim et al., 2012).  
 
In the U.S., company ownership is typically well dispersed into many shareholders. Thus, the agent problem usually 
occurs between the CEO and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Prior tudies reported that in companies 
where ownership and management were less dispersed and the agency problem rarely occurred, the wealth of the 
shareholder increased (Warfield et al., 1995: Choi and Kim, 2001). However, in other studies, the share rate of the 
large shareholder or owner negatively affected the value of the company. For example, Klassens et al. (1999) 
explained that there was a possibility that an owner would hinder the profit of the external minority shareholder by 
reducing the dividend for an external minority shareholder, or by transferring the wealth to another corporate body 
that was within the controlling range of the owner, or by seeking private profits in order to maximize the wealth of 
the owner. That is, as the share rate of the large shareholder gets higher, the possibility also gets higher that the 
agency problem occurs between the large shareholder and the external minority shareholder. Porta et al. (1999) 
found that in nations where there was a higher tendency for the ownership structure to be focused on minor 
controlling shareholders, there existed weaker legal protection for the small number of investors. He argued that the 
possibility was much higher that in those countries, large shareholders would behave opportunistically to lower the 
profits of external minority shareholders. After all, if the largest shareholder moved in this opportunistic way, it 
would be possible for the largest shareholder to discreetly manipulate the profit of the company to achieve his/her 
own personal aims (Park, 2003).  
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2.2 Foreign Shareholder and Earnings Management 
 
It has only been around 15 years since foreign investment started in earnest in Korea. However, as the shares of 
foreign shareholders gradually increased in the Korean market, the stability of the market increased (Song and Park, 
1998). According to the increase of foreign shares, the following positive and negative aspects have been observed. 
In general, foreigner shareholders have primarily focused on long term rather than short term investments. They 
have emphasized intrinsic value according to investment techniques developed in advanced countries. They have 
participated in the management of companies they have invested in more actively to monitor the CEO. This has 
allowed them to restrain the CEO's intention to manage earnings opportunistically (Kim and Bae, 2006).  
 
Accordingly, as foreign investment share rates have increased, the accounting conservatism of the company has 
been reinforced Kim and Bae, 2006). However, these investors have tended to invest in companies that rarely 
engaged in discreet activities (An et al., 2005). Most studies have reported that foreign investment has contributed to 
the relief of information asymmetry in terms of accounting information (Ryu, 2008). However, recent foreign 
investors have shifted their focus toward short term rather than long term investments in Korean companies (Lee et 
al., 2012). In connection with this shift, events hindering the transparency of the company and its long term growth 
have emerged. This has created a side effect; long term company growth has been hindered due to the outflow of 
enormous funds, and the transparency of the company has not been expanded. In addition, many cases have 
occurred in which big baths were induced to take over Korean domestic companies at lower prices. Subsequently, 
either liquidated dividends were paid out within short periods of time, or companies that were taken over were sold 
again, followed by foreign investor withdrawal. These cases have shown that foreign investors can hinder the long 
term growth of Korean domestic companies.  
 
Companies with higher profits can sell shares at higher prices. Thus, if foreign investors want to maximize earnings 
obtained from re-selling shares within a short term, there is a higher possibility that companies with high foreign 
shareholder rates will manage their earnings in a direction that promotes higher earnings. Further, with respect to 
new stock listings and the selling of stocks, companies will manage their earnings in a direction that increases profits 
in an effort to maximize the prices of stocks on sale (Teoh et.al, 1998; Park et al., 2009).  
 
As the foreign share rate increases, earnings management based on the actual activities of the company will decrease 
on average (Kim et al., 2012; Lee and Kang, 2004). This happens because foreign investors who desire relatively 
long and stable investments based on excellent information collection and analyses will work to reduce the earnings 
management of CEOs who try to achieve private goals by using internal information. Further, the restraint effect of 
this type of real earnings management is often attributable to the role of foreign large shareholders holding more 
than 5 % of the share rates of the relevant companies. This is because these shareholders can have greater long, 
actual effects on the decision-making of the company than the usual foreign minority shareholders can (Kim et al., 
2012). Meanwhile, in situations where reported profits are reduced, as foreign investor share rates increase, the level 
of earnings management increases (Lee and Kang, 2004).  
 
On the other hand, in cases in which a foreign shareholder is the largest shareholder of a relevant company, the 
company will report more profit than the actual profit by using the actual company activity. This shows that when a 
foreign investor acquires more than a certain share rate to play a more positive role in raising the value of the 
company and, as a result, becomes the largest shareholder, he/she might approve of decision-making that contradicts 
the value of the company (Kim et al., 2012). In addition, companies generally increase their earnings management in 
a direction that raises profits as the share rates of the large shareholders and foreign shareholders increase. On the 
contrary, with respect to moving in a direction that reduces profits, there are no differences between the share rates 
of large shareholders and foreign shareholders (Park et al., 2009).  
 
2.3. Financial Institution Earnings Management 
 
The following case study explores the big bath phenomenon as it occurred during changes in large shareholders at Z 
Savings Bank. This case study takes into consideration a number of prior studies carried out on the big bath 
phenomenon during large shareholder changes as well as on earnings management for savings bank businesses. 
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Regarding company earnings management, studies on particular situations and strategies have been conducted from 
multiple angles.  
 
Regarding prior studies on financial institution earnings management, Ma (1998) insisted on earning smoothing by 
using a set amount for loan loss allowances based on panel data for U.S. banks. After carrying out the related 
analyses, U.S. banks reported earnings smoothing via the set amount of loan loss allowances. McNichols and 
Wilson (1998) also looked into how banks performed earnings management via a set amount of loan loss 
allowances. In their study, they analyzed 10 return on asset- (ROA-) based portfolios to prove that banks performed 
earnings management. In doing so, they also showed that there existed a significant relationship between the 
discretionary factors of the set amount of loan loss allowances and the portfolio order. Choi (2003) revealed that 
Korean banks increased or decreased their reported profits by using loan loss allowances. Moon (2004) insisted that 
the discretion of the CEO had a greater effect in the recognition of bad debt expenses related to loan receivables. 
Moon’s analysis found that when earnings before management were higher (or lower), bad debt expenses were 
additionally recognized at the end of the accounting period. The bad debt expenses were higher or lower than the 
actual case for earnings smoothing. Ultimately, it seems clear that the degree to which a company writes off 
doubtful accounts is related to that company’s loan receivables. 
 
Bad debt expenses in the banking sector have the most influence on financial numerical values. Kim et al., (2012) 
analyzed the big bath phenomenon during CEO changes based on accounting processes used to write off bad debts. 
They showed that in a year when a manager changed, either greater bad debt expenses were created or other costs 
increased such as restructuring costs. In addition, the operating income and net income decreased significantly 
compared to the years before and after the change. This coincided with a strong improvement in management 
performance in the following year. This can be interpreted as the big bath phenomenon. By studying the loan 
receivables and loan loss allowances for each accounting year, it was clear that when the CEO changed, compared to 
other similar banks, the increased width of the rate of loan loss allowances was highly significant. When the rate of 
allowances for bad debts increased, it was determined that there was an increased tendency for bad debt expenses.  
 
Ji and Park (2006) studied the big bath phenomenon as it related to savings banks. They found that the manager of a 
mutual savings bank artificially adjusted the capital adequacy ratio for risk-weighted assets by using loan loss 
allowances. If the capital adequacy ratio before adjustment was lower than the numerical value reported to the 
Financial Supervisory Commission in the prior term, Ji and Park deemed that the manager would feel compelled to 
adjust the capital adequacy ratio. They then investigated whether this was carried out via loan loss allowances. They 
concluded that when the capital adequacy ratio before adjustments was lower than expected levels, the manager 
reduced the setting rate for the loan loss allowances. Thus, Ji and Park argued that Korean savings banks adjusted 
their loan loss allowances in order to control their capital adequacy ratios.  
 
Overall, the present study differentiates itself from other studies in four important ways. First, whereas previous 
studies were conducted only in the financial sector, this study focuses on savings banks, which are non-monetary 
institutions. Second, it distinguishes between savings banks that experienced foreign capital influxes from cases in 
which savings banks were taken over via domestic capital. Third, while previous studies looked at the big bath 
phenomenon specifically during CEO changes, this study focuses on periods in which large shareholders are 
changed. Fourth, a Korean native savings bank is compared with a savings bank into which overseas capital was 
invested.  
 
3. CASE STUDY 
 
3.1 Case Selection Process and Current Status of Savings Bank Business 
 
This study selected Z Savings Bank, which was a recipient of the initial influx of Western capital investments. From 
around 15 years ago, foreign capital began pouring into savings banks. A greater amount of capital came from 
foreign sources than from large Korean companies due to the negative image that Korean companies had cultivated. 
If funds were raised at the low interest rates, the funds could be operated at higher interest rates in Korea. This 
resulted in high profits. However, Korean financial companies remained passive with respect to financial businesses 
for ordinary individuals because they did not want to be seen as loan sharks.  
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In this financial environment, once it received Western capital, Z Savings Bank compared well against companies 
relying on Korean capital inflows in terms of transparent sales and finance performance. With this in mind, the 
present authors have attempted to explore the big bath phenomenon in the current market by comparing the two case 
types: (a) cases in which the financial performance of the relevant year was highly aggravated whenever a large 
shareholder changed, and (b) cases in which the financial performance of the next year was highly improved.  
 
The case study focused on the years running from 2005 to 2015, though it also specifically looked at the four cases 
over the last decade in which large shareholders changed. First, in April 2005, a large shareholder changed from an 
individual to another individual. Next, in September 2010, ABC Corporation (a Korean firm) engaged in a 100 % 
takeover. Afterwards, in October 2013, XYZ Group, a Western capital firm, took over Z Savings Bank in Korea. 
Particularly in 2010 and 2013, during the processes in which capital came in from a large Korean company and large 
foreign company, management aggravation intensified. The present study has endeavored to consider these 
variations and analyze the extent to which the changes in shareholders and foreign capital inflow affected the bank’s 
earnings management.  
 
Savings banks attract their base by differentiating themselves from big banks and targeting local businesses and 
ordinary households and individuals. In Korea, these banks adhere to the rules covered by a presidential decree that 
was enacted on August 3rd, 1972 as a part of urgent financial measures designed to encourage stability and economic 
growth. This decree included laws on mutual savings and financing companies, and they were intended to allow 
public financial institutions to operate private financial markets. In fact, private financial markets needed 
restrictions; at the time, they were chaotic. Thus, the changes sought to establish sound credit order and protect 
traders. The primary businesses involved in this included mutual savings businesses as well as businesses that 
provided the installment of credit, micro credit via amortization, and bill discounting for credit union members or 
individuals paying in installments. The laws governing mutual savings and financing companies were amended into 
a mutual savings bank law in March 2001. Consequently, mutual savings and financing companies changed their 
firm names into mutual savings banks in 2002. A mutual savings bank uses an integrated account number system 
through a network provided by the Korea Financial Telecommunications and Clearings Institute, and its interest and 
lending rates are somewhat higher than those of general banks.  
 
The government began expelling these savings banks in the first half of 2011. A primary reason for this was the 
issue of supervision. These banks were designed to serve as financing institutions for ordinary individuals while 
performing the role of a large investment bank. However, they remained at the level of financing institutions for 
ordinary individuals, and this put them squarely into a supervision dead zone. Subsequently, after 2011, savings 
banks underwent enormous restructuring. The resulting Korean financing companies were passive with respect to 
offering finance services for ordinary individuals for fear of being labeled loan sharks. This situation resulted in 
significant encroachment in the loan and savings bank market for ordinary individuals by Japanese finance capital. 
In particular, Japanese capital providers rapidly entered the Korean savings bank sector to take the lead in the 
Korean savings bank market.  
 
3.2 Loan Loss Allowances and Earnings Possibilities 
 
When Korea complied with the Korea-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (K-GAAP), the higher amount 
between the lowest savings rate (as defined by a detailed enforcement of bank supervision operations) and the 
experienced loss rate (based on expected losses) was added up to determine loan loss allowances.  
 
Thus, savings banks classified the soundness of their loan receivables according to five steps –normal, problematic, 
fixed, doubtful of collection, and probable loss. They did this by taking into account the ability of the debtor to repay 
the debt and the debtor’s financial transaction details during the process in which loan loss allowances were set. In 
this way, after a savings bank enacted this classification system for asset soundness, it added up its loan loss 
allowances, which were higher than the minimum savings rate, for each classification to reflect these considerations 
in their financial statements.  
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Savings banks run into problems due to lower levels of reliability and the lack of robust business models. Their 
competitiveness continues to worsen, and savings banks that have fallen into capital encroachment by distressed 
debt due to project financing (PF) through the re-assessment of assets have repeatedly experienced management 
aggravation. Ownership and governance structure problems have emerged, including governance structures 
centering on individual large shareholders with low social credit related to capital strength. In addition, governance 
structure is centered on large shareholders, who can be despotic. Their actions include irregular involvement in 
management, resulting in no clear divisions between ownership and management. For these reasons, savings banks 
have developed structures in which management could not easily be checked via internal controls or outside 
directors and auditors.  
 
12 of 16 savings banks whose businesses were suspended in the past underwent conversions into private safes for 
large shareholders via illegal activities. These banks were pushed into giving high risk loans, including credit loans 
to individuals with low credit scores, as well as PF loans. Despite the high levels of risk, savings banks did not have 
sufficient risk management systems in place. Furthermore, as loan competitions between banks worsened after the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, a large number of traditional customers such as small and medium sized businesses 
and single individuals cancelled their accounts. This weakened the overall sales base, causing banks to look for 
alternative solutions. They expanded their loan services and sought out new individuals and service businesses by 
invoking new financial liberalization measures. These measures included a reduction in the levels of capital 
requirement for large companies and the removal of restrictions regarding the approval of loans to businesses that 
were deemed risky. Ultimately, savings banks failed to develop their own unique business models due to the strong 
competition coming from financial institutions and the rapid changes to the financial regulation environment. 
Instead, they relied on deregulation, and they were operated with too much importance given to high risk, high profit 
assets, including real estate PF loans and real estate funds.  
 
In terms of policy and system, deregulation was permitted in order to (a) raise the competitiveness of adequately 
functioning savings banks, and (b) serve as a catalyst for the restructuring of poorly performing savings banks. The 
plan backfired; deregulation resulted in lax morals and a forced expansion of outer forms. Moreover, although 
ownership was concentrated among a small number of people, savings banks provided the same level of benefit 
from deposit insurance as regular banks did. There were some restrictions in place. Savings banks were required to 
have a BIS ratio of greater than 8 %, and only 8 % of their loans could be deemed substandard and below the ratio. 
Deregulation on loan limits were carried out, and under the new rules, savings banks were required to maintain real 
estate PF loan rates at below 30 % in order to check against excessive PF loans. Nevertheless, the savings banks 
pursued an expansion in terms of the accumulation of allowances, and with a strong real estate market in Korea, 
excessive PF loans and the forced form expansion continued. In addition, financial liberalization and deregulation 
trends caused looser supervision for savings banks compared to that for conventional banks. As a result, lengthy 
grace periods were bestowed on savings banks. This prevented timely correction measures from being enacted for 
poorly performing savings banks. M&As occurred to stabilize the financial market, but Korea still experienced an 
expansion in risky financial situations.  
 
3.3 Case Analysis 
 
The Z Group holds a vast global network providing financial services in Korea, Britain, Spain, and Ireland. The 
group is centered in Australia, though it has also deployed businesses in Singapore and the U.S.. The main 
businesses of the Z Group include lending, advisory services, and asset management. It is also continuing its 
expansion into European and Asian markets. As of the end of June 2015, the Z Group manages assets of around 31 
trillion won, and it has earned a reputation for customer reliability due to transparent, clean management.  
 
3.3.1 Large Shareholder Change in April 2005 
 
In 2005, the Korean economy showed a typical economic downturn, which was caused by a high slowdown in net 
exports. Accordingly, the Korean economy showed somewhat lower economic growth compared to the previous 
year. The depression continued to hit service businesses, and industrial production growth rates dropped into single 
digits. Exports, the diffusion index, and other leading economic indicators continued slowing down as domestic 
businesses slumped. At the same time, inventories increased.  
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Z Savings Bank changed its large shareholder and then took charge of management on April 1, 2005. When the 
change occurred, no significant variations emerged in terms of accounting ratios such as bad debt expenses, loan 
loss allowances, or credit loss provision rates. Thus, in this case, where an individual-to-individual change of large 
shareholders occurred, the big bath phenomenon did not occur. 
 
Table 1 shows financial data as of June 30, 2004, June 30, 2005, and June 30, 2006. It is clear that the big bath 
phenomenon did not occur. In the year of change, loan receivables increased and loan loss allowances decreased 
compared to the year prior. Consequently, the loan loss allowance rate and credit loss provision rate decreased from 
4.08 % to 2.03 % and from 2.40 % to 0.65 %, respectively. The rate at which bad debts were written off also 
decreased from 18.14 % to 6.37 %. Consequently, operating income and net income increased compared to the 
previous year.  
 
Table 1. Financial Highlights for Z Savings Bank 
(Unit: million won, %) 
Classification 2004.6.30. (Year prior ) 
2005.6.30. 
(Year of change ) 
2006.6.30. 
(Year following) 
Loan receivables (a) 37,045 40,032 91,234 
Allowance for loan losses (b) 1,511 813 1,432 
Rate of allowance for loan losses (b/a) 4.08 2.03 1.57 
Rate of provision for credit losses 2.40 0.76 0.78 
Operating revenue (c) 4,907 4,787 10,003 
Operating expenses 4,358 3,805 6,517 
Bad debt expenses (d) 890 305 715 
Rate of bad debts written off (d/c) 18.14 6.37 7.15 
Operating income (loss) 549 981 3,487 
Net income (loss) 609 971 2,529 
Note: Rate of allowance for loan losses = Ending balance of allowance for loan losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of provision for credit losses = Provision for credit losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of bad debts written off = Bad debt expenses / Operating revenue 
 
3.3.1.1 Comparison with Other Savings Banks 
 
Currently, there are 79 savings banks in Korea. The present authors randomly selected two from the top eight (in 
terms of asset size) for comparison and analysis. Specifically, the authors were interested to see whether either of the 
two banks experienced a big bath in the same accounting year (2005).  
 
As can be seen in Table 2, J Savings Bank, showed a decrease in its loan loss allowance rate from 4.92 % to 4.72 % 
in the year the large shareholder changed at Z Savings Bank. Decreases also occurred for the credit loss provision 
rate and the bad debt write-off rate from 23.58 % to 20.51 % and from 3.16 % to 2.24 %, respectively. Loan 
receivables were 541.6 billion won in 2006, a 17.71% increase over the year of change. Loan loss allowances were 
25.7 billion won in 2006, a 18.43 % increase over the year of change. When considering the year right after the 
change, loan receivables increased, but loan loss allowances and bad debt expenses did not show significant 
variations.  
 
In the case of K Savings Bank, in 2005, loan receivables increased 27 % over the prior year, while loan loss 
allowances increased 56 %. Thus, the loan loss allowance rate rose by 1.16 % from 4.91 % to 6.07 %. The credit 
loss provision rate and the bad debt write-off rate increased from 1.52 % to 2.08 % and from 11. 12% to 18.07 %, 
respectively. In the year of change, operating expense increased by which operating income rapidly decreased, and 
finally the business performance shows net income, 2.5 billion won, which was produced by 70% reduced compared 
to the year right before change. The big bath phenomenon did not occur. 
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Table 2. Financial Highlights of Two Other Savings Banks 
(Unit: million won, %) 
Classification 2004.6.30. (Year prior ) 
2005.6.30. 
(Year of change ) 
2006.6.30. 
(Year following) 
J Savings Bank 
Loan receivables (a) 369,105 460,804 541,561 
Allowance for loan losses (b) 18,157 21,754 25,717 
Rate of allowance for loan losses (b/a) 4.92 4.72 4.75 
Rate of provision for credit losses 3.16 2.24 2.82 
Operating revenue (c) 49,526 50,397 61,772 
Operating expenses 45,640 46,910 55,488 
Bad debt expenses (d) 11,677 10,337 15,277 
Rate of bad debts written off (d/c) 23.58 20.51 24.73 
Operating income (loss) 3,886 3,487 6,284 
Net income (loss) 4,140 2,872 4,766 
K Savings Bank 
Loan receivables (a) 339,732 430,201 575,668 
Allowance for loan losses (b) 16,692 26,093 15,954 
Rate of allowance for loan losses (b/a) 4.91 6.07 2.77 
Rate of provision for credit losses 1.52 2.08 0.01 
Operating revenue (c) 46,288 49,435 66,594 
Operating expenses 38,470 46,814 44,882 
Bad debt expenses (d) 5,174 8,934 32 
Rate of bad debts written off (d/c) 11.12 18.07 0.05 
Operating income (loss) 7,818 2,622 21,713 
Net income (loss) 8,048 2,468 24,007 
Note: Rate of allowance for loan losses = Ending balance of allowance for loan losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of provision for credit losses = Provision for credit losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of bad debts written off = Bad debt expenses/ Operating revenue 
 
Table 3 compares the three savings banks. In the case of Z Savings Bank, the bad debt write-off rate slightly 
increased. For J Savings Bank, the bad debt write-off rate maintained the same level as in the year prior, but for K 
Savings Bank, the rate declined steeply.  
 
When looking at the loan loss allowance rate for Z Savings Bank, the rate during the year of change was lower than 
the year prior. In the year following the change, it continued to decline. The credit loss provision rate declined 
steeply in the year of change compared to the year prior. On the contrary, for J Savings Bank, the loan loss 
allowance rate did not change significantly through the three-year period. The credit loss provision rate decreased in 
the year of change compared to the year prior, and it increased in the year following. For K Savings Bank, when 
looking at the loan loss allowance rate and the credit loss provision rate, loan receivables increased due to the 
enhanced business performance in the year of change compared to the year prior. The bank’s operating income and 
net income dropped steeply from the prior year.  
 
Table 3. Savings Bank Comparison 
(Unit: %) 
Classification 2004.6.30. (Year prior ) 
2005.6.30. 
(Year of change ) 
2006.6.30. 
(Year following) 
Rate of Bad Debt 
Written Off 
Z Savings Bank 18.14 6.37 7.15 
J Savings Bank 23.58 20.51 24.73 
K Savings Bank 11.12 18.07 0.05 
Rate of allowance 
for loan losses 
Z Savings Bank 4.08 2.03 1.57 
J Savings Bank 4.92 4.72 4.75 
K Savings Bank 4.91 6.07 2.77 
Rate of provision 
for credit losses 
Z Savings Bank 2.40 0.76 0.78 
J Savings Bank 3.16 2.24 2.82 
K Savings Bank 1.52 2.08 0.01 
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3.3.2 Large Shareholder Change in September 2010  
 
In 2010, the global economy was in a recovery phase. This recovery had started in the second half in 2009, and it 
was clearly gaining steam in the following year. Economic stimulus packages for 2010 exceeded those of 2009, and 
in the E.U., measures introduced in 2009 to stimulate the economy were now being fully carried out. Korea 
responded strongly to this trend, and at a 6.5 % growth rate, showed the most rapid recovery among all OECD 
nations. The national income per person exceeded 20,000 dollars, and Korea ranked 7th globally in terms of exports. 
Overseas media outlets and a number of international organizations pointed to Korea as textbook case in recovering 
from an economic crisis. In particular, in November 2010, Korea successfully hosted a G20 summit conference, 
enabling the country to significantly enhance its international status. 
 
In 2011, PF rates and real estate loan rates related to savings banks increased sharply. This introduced a very real 
risk of a high number of bankruptcies. Early in 2011, the Financial Supervisory Commission imposed business 
suspensions on several savings banks. This resulted in a bank run fad across the entire savings bank sector. Savings 
banks became less reliable, and they lacked the capability to develop solid credit estimation systems and perform 
adequate credit risk management. This also limited their ability to expand their supply of services (Lee, 2012). In 
this situation, savings bank competitiveness was continuously aggravated. Thus, the Financial Supervisory 
Commission reinforced the role of the savings bank as the financial institution for ordinary people. They did this 
through policies to handle finances, and they allowed loan companies to take over savings banks. Regulations were 
also relaxed to pave the way for a more diversified range of businesses.  
 
In September 2010, a Korean firm, ABC Corporation, took over 100% of the shares of Z Savings Bank. Table 4 
shows the financials in the year right before the large shareholder change and in the year right after. The loan loss 
allowance rate during the year of changed increased by 1.51%. The credit loss provision rate was 3.52 %, a 2.34 % 
increase from the 1.18 % rate during the year prior. When the bad debt expense rate was compared to the operating 
income, there was a 3.5-fold increase from 9.43 % in 2009 to 32.99 % in 2010. This is the big bath phenomenon. 
Management attempted to dispose of as many distressed debts as possible during the accounting year in which a 
large shareholder changed. The reason for this centered on the takeover price. Essentially, management sought to 
minimize the remaining value of the company in order to influence the price paid by the new shareholder. 
Accordingly, a company that was creating a net income prior to the takeover was converted into a company with a 
sharply rising deficit. However, in the year following the shareholder change, the credit loss provision rate and the 
doubtful account write-off rate returned to the conventional values that existed prior to the shareholder change. 
Ultimately, although aftereffects of the big bath phenomenon persisted, the deficit began to drop dramatically. 
Previous studies have indicated that a change in the largest shareholder (i.e. a significant variation in the governance 
structure within the company occurs) has a direct influence on the earnings management of the CEO (Kim, 2010). 
As such, it is not surprising that the big bath phenomenon occurred for Z Savings Bank when a large shareholder 
changed.  
 
Table 4. Financial Highlights of Z Savings Bank 
(Unit: million won, %) 
Classification 2009.6.30. (Before change) 
2010.6.30. 
(Year of change) 
2011.6.30. 
(After change) 
Loan receivables (a) 170,426 204,107 184,286 
Allowance for loan losses (b) 5,599 9,807 12,443 
Rate of allowance for loan losses (b/a) 3.29 4.80 6.75 
Rate of provision for credit losses 1.18 3.52 1.43 
Operating revenue (c) 21,243 21,772 23,109 
Operating expenses 20,119 30,366 24,817 
Bad debt expenses (d) 2,005 7,182 2,632 
Rate of bad debt written off (d/c) 9.43 32.99 11.39 
Operating income (loss) (1,125) (8,594) (1,708) 
Net income (loss) 963 (8,824) (1,455) 
Note: Rate of allowance for loan losses = Ending balance of allowance for loan losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of provision for credit losses = Provision for credit losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of bad debts written off = Bad debt expenses/ Operating revenue 
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3.3.2.1 Comparison with Other Savings Banks 
 
Table 5 shows that in the case of J Savings Bank, the loan loss allowance rate increased slightly from 3.46 % in 
2009 (the year right before the shareholder changed at Z Savings Bank) to 3.86 % in 2010. The operating revenue 
was 160.5 billion won in 2010, a slight reduction from the 162.5 billion won posted in 2009. Thus, the bad debt 
write-off rate did not change significantly. Bad debt expenses in 2010 were 31.3 billion won, just shy of the 31.9 
billion won listed in 2010. Accordingly, the credit loss provision rate dropped slightly from 2.84 % in 2009 to 2.51 
% in 2010.  
 
As for K Savings Bank, in the year the large shareholder changed at Z Savings Bank (2010), loan loss allowances 
increased by 14.1 billion won (55.1 %) over 2009. In other words the loan loss allowance rate increased 1.04 % 
from 2.98 % to 3.93 %, and the credit loss provision rate also rose from 0.66 % to 1.38 %.  
 
As for operating revenue, the loan receivables that were classified as normal in 2011 compared to the prior year 
were partly converted into problematic, fixed and doubtful of collection. The operating income was reduced by 
setting a large number of bad debt expenses related to the soundness of assets. Finally, regarding these bad debt 
expenses, a total of 14 billion won was posted in 2010, meaning that 8.1 billion won (137. 28 %) added to the 5.9 
billion won posted in 2009. The bad debt write-off rate increased 7.79 % from 4.62 % in 2009 to 12.41 % in 2010. 
Thus, the operating revenue was also 14 billion won, a 14.2 billion won reduction over the prior year.  
 
Table 5. Financial Highlights of Two Other Savings Banks 
(Unit: million won, %) 
Classification 2009.6.30. (Before change ) 
2010.6.30. 
(Year of change ) 
2011.6.30. 
(After change) 
J Savings Bank 
Loan receivables (a) 1,123,547 1,244,380 1,347,812 
Allowance for loan losses (b) 38,871 48,076 50,046 
Rate of allowance for loan losses (b/a) 3.46 3.86 3.71 
Rate of provision for credit losses 2.84 2.51 1.92 
Operating revenue (c) 
Operating expenses 885,414 1,010,457 1,053,595 
Bad debt expenses (d) 
Rate of bad debts written off (d/c) 25,569 39,680 43,809 
Operating income (loss) 2.89 3.93 4.16 
Net income (loss) 0.66 1.38 0.56 
K Savings 
Bank 
Loan receivables (a) 2010.6.30 2011.6.30 2012.6.30 










Rate of provision for credit losses 18,518 11,026 13,441 
Operating revenue (c) 127,073 112,804 119,144 
Operating expenses 99,041 97,971 99,270 
Bad debt expenses (d) 5,876 14,001 5,336 
Rate of bad debts written off (d/c) 4.62 12.41 4.48 
Operating income (loss) 28,041 14,033 19,875 
Net income (loss) 20,051 13,187 17,954 
Note: Rate of allowance for loan losses = Ending balance of allowance for loan losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of provision for credit losses = Provision for credit losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of bad debts written off = Bad debt expenses/ Operating revenue 
 
Table 6 summarizes the comparison of the three banks. In the case of Z Savings Bank, the bad debt write-off rate in 
the year the large shareholder changed (2010) was 32.99 %. This marked a 23.56 % increase over the 9.43 % listed 
in 2009. However, in 2011, it decreased by a third. The credit loss provision rate was 3.52%, a 2.34 % increase over 
the 1.18 % posted in 2009. In 2011, it dropped to 1.43 %. When compared to Z Savings Bank, large financial 
changes were not observed in the two other banks for the same period.  
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In terms of the accumulation of preemptive loan loss allowances – a measure taken to protect against overall 
economic regression and a real estate slowdown – the rate of allowances for doubtful accounts actually increased. 
This shows that burdens were being incurred with respect to the economic status of the savings bank and its efforts 
to set allowances for distressed debts. Meanwhile, the loan loss allowances could be set as high as possible within 
the accounting period in which the deficit was created. Subsequently, in the following year, a big bath could be used 
to obtain reliability from the persons concerned. In fact, this phenomenon is common. Companies in this situation 
will attempt to dispose of a deficit with an accounting year, and then, in the following year, all expectations will be 
for a significant improvement in management performance. Overall, such efforts are channeled through loan loss 
allowances since the big bath phenomenon bases itself on obtaining a high level of management reliability from the 
persons concerned. 
 
Table 6. Savings Bank Comparison 
(Unit: %) 
Classification 2009.6.30. (Year prior ) 
2010.6.30. 
(Year of change ) 
2011.6.30. 
(Year following) 
Rate of Bad Debt 
Written Off 
Z Savings Bank 9.43 32.99 11.39 
J Savings Bank 19.64 19.49 15.86 
K Savings Bank 4.62 12.41 4.48 
Rate of allowance for 
loan losses 
Z Savings Bank 3.29 4.80 6.75 
J Savings Bank 3.46 3.86 3.71 
K Savings Bank 2.89 3.93 4.16 
Rate of provision for 
credit losses 
Z Savings Bank 1.18 3.52 1.43 
J Savings Bank 2.84 2.51 1.92 
K Savings Bank 0.66 1.38 0.56 
 
3.3.3 Large Shareholder Change in October 2013  
 
In 2014, the Korean economy continued its gradual recovery centering on domestic consumption. This was in large 
part due to expansionary macroeconomic policies despite overseas difficulties, including the weak recovery of the 
global economy. The annual growth rate was recorded as 3.3 %, so the growth trend had expanded over the previous 
year. In particular, the contribution to growth provided by domestic consumption saw significant expansion (1.5 % 
to 2.8 %). Consumer prices rose 1.3 % for the year, an identical increase to that of the previous year. This was due to 
the stability of influential supply factors such as the stability of farm product prices according to the good weather 
and the decline of international oil prices. Due to the recovery of domestic consumption, income income rose by 1.9 
%, although exports received an even higher boost (2.3 %). Accordingly, the current account surplus was 89.22 
billion dollars, the highest surplus ever recorded. Foreign exchange holdings were recorded at 363.3 billion dollars, 
a 17.1 billion dollar increase over the year prior.  
 
In October 2013, Z Savings Bank was taken over by XYZ Group, a foreign mortgage company that not only dealt 
with renting equipment and vehicles, but also with consumption finance and mortgages for houses and commerce. 
XYZ Group was also a large issuer of large subprime residential mortgage back securities (RMBSes). [Table 7] 
shows the financials in the year right before the large shareholder changed (2013) and in the following year. In 2013, 
due a large improvement in sales, the loan loss allowance rate was 11.46 %, a 3.04 % increase over the 8.42 % 
posted in the first half of the year. The credit loss provision rate also saw a large increase from 0.17 % in 2012 to 
4.93 % in 2013. Operating revenue in 2013 was 18.5 billion won, a 16.34 % increase over the 15.9 billion won the 
year prior. However, when the shareholder changed in 2013, bad debt expenses added up to 7.3 billion won, a 7.1 
billion won increase over the 160 million won posted in 2012. This means that the typical big bath phenomenon 
appeared.  
 
Finally, when the operating loss was created in the first half of the year, the operating deficit was highly expanded. 
This deficit continued right through to the year after the change.  
 
In general, when faced with a takeover, companies set their maximum bad debt write-offs and maximum loan loss 
allowances based on their indirect liability and distressed debts. This is because when companies decide on the value 
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of a takeover, they are very sensitive regarding their net asset value. This value is produced by subtracting total 
debts from total assets. This means that during a merger process or during an actual inspection process prior to the 
shareholder change, the company is able to remove a sufficient amount of distressed debts. This is how the big bath 
phenomenon can come about via the setting of loan loss allowances. 
 
This implies that bad debt write-offs and loan loss allowances are reflected as much as possible in the accounting in 
order to provide transparency in the year of a large shareholder change. This happens primarily because the 
Financial Supervisory Commission also reinforced an obligatory rate at which allowances are set in order to protect 
the soundness of assets. After a large shareholder changes, the large shareholder sometimes reduces the earnings 
management of the CEO by strengthening the monitoring of and efficient controlling of the decision-making of the 
CEO (Kim, 2010).  
 
Table 7. Financial Highlights of Z Savings Bank 
 (Unit: million won, %) 
Classification 2012.6.30. (Year prior ) 
2013.6.30. 
(Year of change ) 
2014.6.30. 
(Year following) 
Loan receivables (a) 98,508 148,762 313,492 
Allowance for loan losses (b) 8,294 17,045 7,019 
Rate of allowance for loan losses (b/a) 8.42 11.46 2.24 
Rate of provision for credit losses 0.17 4.93 1.89 
Operating revenue (c) 15,948 18,552 29,894 
Operating expenses 17,520 31,436 39,096 
Bad debt expenses (d) 164 7,329 5,919 
Rate of bad debts written off (d/c) 1.03 39.51 19.79 
Operating income (loss) (1,572) (12,884) (9,203) 
Net income (loss) (2,233) (12,379) (8,701) 
Note:  
Rate of allowance for loan losses = Ending balance of allowance for loan losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of provision for credit losses= Provision for credit losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of bad debts written off = Bad debt expenses / Operating revenue 
 
3.3.3.1 Comparison with Other Savings Banks 
 
As can be seen in [Table 8], in the case of J Savings Bank, loan loss allowances increased slightly from 4.58 % to 
5.85 %, and the credit loss provision rate increased from 2.69 % from 4.01 %. The bad debt write-off rate dropped 
from 34.17 to 21.38 %. Accordingly, 9.8 billion won of the business deficit from the prior year was converted into a 
surplus for 2013. In conclusion, in the case of J Savings Bank, when comparing the year prior to the shareholder 
change and the year of the change, the credit loss provision rate and bad debt write-off rate both decreased. 
 
For K Savings Bank, in the year the large shareholder changed at Z Savings Bank, loan receivables classified as 
fixed or doubtful of collection (in terms of their asset soundness) partly increased so that the loan loss allowance rate 
increased slightly from 3.54 % to 4.11 %, and the credit loss provision rate also increased slightly from 0.76 % to 
1.32 %. The operating income partly declined compared to the year prior, and the bad debt write-off rate increased 
from 7.55 % to 13.91 % in the year of change. However, because operating expenses decreased, the operating 
income totaled 27.6 billion won, a 6.6 billion won jump over the year prior.  
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Table 8. Financial Highlights of Two Other Savings Banks 
(Unit: million won, %) 
Classification 2012.6.30. (Year prior ) 
2013.6.30. 
(Year of change ) 
2014.6.30. 
(Year following) 
J Savings Bank 
Loan receivables (a) 1,269,980 1,080,018 1,139,702 
Allowance for loan losses (b) 58,227 63,200 71,248 
Rate of allowance for loan losses (b/a) 4.58 5.85 6.25 
Rate of provision for credit losses 4.01 2.69 2.57 
Operating revenue (c) 148,947 131,218 123,229 
Operating expenses 162,058 121,367 99,622 
Bad debt expenses (d) 50,895 29,050 29,239 
Rate of bad debts written off (d/c) 34.17 21.38 23.73 
Operating income (loss) (13,112) 9,851 23,607 
Net income (loss) (9,379) 7,848 17,321 
K Savings 
Bank 
Loan receivables (a) 1,105,038 1,147,289 1,467,685 
Allowance for loan losses (b) 39,136 47,196 45,455 
Rate of allowance for loan losses (b/a) 3.54 4.11 3.10 
Rate of provision for credit losses 0.76 1.32 - 
Operating revenue (c) 111,854 108,480 123,708 
Operating expenses 90,850 80,871 80,530 
Bad debt expenses (d) 8,440 15,087  
Rate of bad debts written off (d/c) 7.55 13.91  
Operating income (loss) 21,004 27,609 43,179 
Net income (loss) 12,304 25,658 34,766 
Note: 
Rate of allowance for loan losses = Ending balance of allowance for loan losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of provision for credit losses= Provision for credit losses / Ending balance of loan receivables  
Rate of bad debts written off = Bad debt expenses/ Operating revenue 
 
Table 9 shows that for Z Savings Bank, the bad debt write-off rate in the year of change was 39.51%, a 38.48 % 
increase over the 1.03 % posted in the year prior. In the year right after change, it was 19.79 %. The credit loss 
provision rate was 4.93 %, a 4.76 % increase over the year prior when a 0.17 % was posted. It dropped to 1.89 % in 
the year after the change.  
 
Overall, significant financial changes were not observed in the two other savings banks during the same period of 
time. This indicates that the big bath phenomenon occurs as a result of a change in large shareholders.  
 
Table 9.  Savings Bank Comparison 
(Unit: %) 
Classification 2012.6.30. (Year prior ) 
2013.6.30. 
(Year of change ) 
2014.6.30. 
(Year following) 
Rate of Bad Debt 
Written Off 
Z Savings Bank 1.03 39.51 19.79 
J Savings Bank 34.17 21.38 23.73 
K Savings Bank 7.55 13.91 - 
Rate of allowance for 
loan losses 
Z Savings Bank 8.4 11.46 2.24 
J Savings Bank 4.58 5.85 6.25 
K Savings Bank 3.54 4.11 3.10 
Rate of provision for 
credit losses 
Z Savings Bank 0.17 4.93 1.89 
J Savings Bank 4.01 2.69 2.57 





Accounting manipulations within financial institutions are carried out in a variety of ways. Regarding the 
accumulation of loan loss allowances for the loan losses specifically related to loan receivables, it is highly possible 
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that a large shareholder or management power holder will exercise their discretionary rights. This is despite the fact 
that financial institutions should set their allowances for loan losses according to appropriate asset soundness 
classifications related to loan receivables as required by the Financial Supervisory Commission. In reality, it is very 
likely that management power holders will manipulate loan loss allowances for the purpose of adjusting reported 
profits or managing BIS capital adequacy ratios (Kang and Hwang, 2013).  
 
Mutual savings banks are financial institutions for ordinary customers. These customers prefer mutual savings banks 
with high operating incomes, financial soundness, and stability. All of these characteristics can be verified via audit 
reports. By extension, customers will tend to avoid dealing with mutual savings banks with falling profits since they 
are deemed as poorly performing institutions. Therefore, the upper management within these banks will seek to 
enhance a positive image in multiple ways, including via the reporting of high earnings. When necessary, this can be 
achieved by carrying out a big bath and managing the BIS capital adequacy ratio. Manipulating loan loss allowances 
can be achieved discreetly, and this technique allows management to garner trust from the public.  
 
This study analyzed this earnings management phenomenon through the bad debt expenses according to shareholder 
changes at Z Savings Bank, a non-monetary institution. J Savings Bank and K Savings Bank were selected for 
comparison. The big bath phenomenon, which occurred before and after large shareholder changes, was then 
analyzed by looking at the bad debt expenses and loan loss allowances.  
 
According to the study results, when an individual-to-individual change of large shareholders occurred at Z Savings 
Bank, the financials were not significantly affected. However, when an individual-to-company (or individual-to-
group) change of large shareholders occurred at the same bank, a strong big bath resulted. It should be noted that the 
individual-to-company (or individual-to-group) changes were accompanied by foreign capital inflows. The logic 
behind the big bath phenomenon in this case can be understood as follows. Before the savings bank receives large 
amounts of capital from a large Korean or foreign company, it attempts to find and reflect as many distressed debts 
as possible in its accounting. This is carried out using an inspection process, and it allows the bank to give the 
appearance of being transparent. All of this is done in the year prior to the shareholder change. However, once the 
new shareholder is in place, that shareholder begins monitoring and influencing the decision-making of the 
company. The shareholder uses this control to improve the financial aspects of the bank. In this way, the public is 
convinced that earnings management has been reduced. It also shows that the bank is abiding by the obligatory rate 
of allowance setting enforced by the Financial Supervisory Commission to protect asset soundness.  
 
The results of this study imply the following. First, when a large individual-to-company shareholder changes, during 
the associated accounting period, earnings management is carried out using a big bath. Most companies want to 
show their financial performance on the premise of transparent management. With that in mind, companies are 
creating large deficits in a specific accounting period for a specific purpose. They are setting bad debt expenses and 
loan loss allowances to their maximum limits so that they can reflect the largest net loss possible within that 
accounting year.  
Next, bad debt expenses and loan loss allowances are then used to conduct the desired earnings management. In 
particular, the financial institution sets its relevant loan loss allowances for its loan receivables by occasionally 
assessing the credit rating of the relevant company. When the residue value needed to determine a takeover value is 
calculated at the time the large shareholder changes, a sufficient amount of actual profit is reflected in the 
accounting. Therefore, it is seen as advantageous to utilize these bad debt expenses and loan loss allowances.  
 
Third, in the year right after the large shareholder changes, management performance will be improved in order to 
garner trust from the persons concerned. The allowances were set via the bad debt rate from before the change took 
place, and now management will strive to achieve large improvements in financial performance. It will appear as 
though management has improved since the shareholders changed. When a reversal of loan loss allowances occurs, 
it will seem as though a great contribution has been made to the overall finances of the bank.  
 
It should be noted that this study has certain limitations. It focused on an analysis of bad debt expenses and loan loss 
allowances. However, a more thorough analysis of earnings management would be useful. Such an analysis could 
include detailed factors such as the size of business profits, a recognition of the impairment of good will, and debt 
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ratios. Moreover, only three banks were compared and analyzed in the case analysis. This made it difficult to 
produce generalizations for the entire industry. As such, a study with a larger number of savings banks and relevant 
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